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[Abstract] We analyze differences in performance between private companies (PCs)
and state owned enterprises (SOEs), with an emphasis on the effects of market structure.
We use a panel covering all registered companies during the 1990s in Norway, a country
where SOEs play an important role in regular markets. Return on assets as well as costs
measures are used as measures of performance in models that investigate markets where
SOEs and PCs actually compete with each other. Although market shares and concentration
affect performance, ownership identity still explains most of the inferior performance
among SOEs.
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1. Introduction 
Even though the dominant type of ownership in market-based societies is 
private ownership, cases of state ownership are easy to find. Active and 
deliberate liberalization and privatization policies, especially during the last 
two decades, have led to a considerable reduction in the number of state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) in most countries (see e.g. Sheshinski and López-
Calva [2003]), but many companies remain state owned. There has been a 
long-standing debate on the merits – and problems – of government control 
over business enterprises. State ownership has been defended on the grounds 
of various types of market failure, and it has been regarded as an instrument 
for the attainment of non-economic goals such as the need for public control 
over natural resources, regional policy, employment or social issues etc 
(Grout and Stevens [2003]). The contrasting views are that state ownership 
is mainly used for ideological reasons, that it suits the interests of a ruling 
elite, or that it simply is retained due to institutional inertia. Also, if state 
ownership does increase the scope for deviations from profit-maximizing 
behaviour, the economic performance of SOEs is likely to suffer when 
compared to private companies (PCs).  
Independent of one’s particular point of view on the issue of state 
ownership versus private ownership, most scholars agree that a core question 
in the privatization debate is whether type of ownership has an effect on the 
performance of companies. Recent research on corporate governance 
suggests that ownership issues, such as the concentration and identity of 
owners, affect the performance of companies (Shleifer and Vishny [1997]; 
Thomsen and Pedersen, [2000]). In this paper, we focus on ownership 
identity. If certain ownership types consistently show superior economic 
performance relative to others, it seems reasonable to expect a move away 
from existing ownership arrangements towards the most efficient ones.  
An agency theory perspective on state versus private ownership suggests 
that economic performance levels by and large are the result of the 
incentives, costs, and exposure to disciplinary (market) forces implied by the 
different ownership structures. An alternative view is provided by traditional 
reasoning in industrial economics, which suggests that economic 
performance is a result of the level of competition in a given market and the 
strategies followed by individual firms in that market. Whereas the former 
view would propose that government owned companies should be expected 
to display inferior performance because of inadequacies of that particular 
type of ownership, the latter view suggests that performance differences, if 
any, can largely be explained by differences in market structure.  
Because previous studies on privatization have not paid sufficient 
attention to the various determinants of economic performance, it has been 
unclear whether and to what extent observed performance differences are 
driven by ownership or by market characteristics.1 In their seminal 
contribution to the study of privatization, Vickers and Yarrow [1989, p.39] 
give the following comment on the existing empirical literature:  
“Unfortunately, despite the large number of studies that have been 
conducted, the results of this empirical literature are less informative than 
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might be anticipated. In the first place, many studies focus almost exclusively 
upon the ownership variable and fail to take proper account of the effects on 
performance differences in market structure, regulation, and other relevant 
economic factors. In part, this is simply a consequence of data problems: the 
limited number of observations available renders it difficult to conduct 
complex multifactor analyses.” 
Boardman and Vining [1989] conduct one of the first systematic 
empirical studies of the difference of economic performance between SOEs 
and PCs. Their approach is motivated by the fact that earlier empirical 
studies have failed to adequately control for other relevant factors when 
investigating the ownership effects on performance. In particular, the link 
between competition and performance makes it crucial to include market 
structure measures when assessing the performance across different 
ownership categories. According to Boardman and Vining [1989], previous 
studies focus exclusively on heavily regulated companies and/or industries, 
or industries with the characteristics of monopolies or duopolies. As a result, 
the consequences of market conditions and regulation are virtually 
impossible to distinguish from the effect of different types of owners. 
Recent surveys of available empirical evidence suggest that the findings 
of previous studies do not offer conclusive evidence of systematic 
performance differences between SOEs and PCs. Shirley and Walsh [2000] 
point out that among the 52 studies they survey, five indicate that SOEs 
outperform PCs. However, these studies are all based on analyses of 
monopoly firms in the utility sectors. In 32 of the 52 studies, PCs were better 
performers than SOEs. In the remaining 15 studies no clear performance 
differences were detected. As pointed out by Shirley and Walsh [2000] as 
well by Megginson and Netter [2001], the studies covered in their surveys 
display a substantial degree of heterogeneity with respect to methodology 
and choice of empirical context, which complicates comparisons between 
them. Also, they suffer from a range of design, measurement, and sampling 
problems; most studies have either selected only the largest companies in a 
particular area or region, or focus on companies belonging to one given 
industry. None of the studies cover what can be considered as the population 
of companies in a country. 
In this paper, we utilize a comprehensive panel data set containing 
accounting information for all registered companies in Norway over the 
period 1990 to 1999. We explicitly model both the ownership and market 
structure effects on performance. The availability and quality of relevant 
data in Norway makes our choice of country highly relevant. Furthermore, 
the ownership composition in Norway is in itself particularly well suited for 
exploring the issue of state versus private ownership. Despite several 
examples of privatization and part-privatization during recent years, state 
ownership remains common in Norway. According to Roland et al. [2001] 
the value added share of SOEs in the business sectors in Norway is the 
highest of all EU and EEA-countries. In 1998, the share was 29%, up from 
27% in 1991, which is approximately the double of what we find in Sweden 
and Greece, the nations ranked below Norway. In the EU, the average SOE 
share of value added was only 9%. The Norwegian pattern is partly related 
to the dominance of SOEs in the oil industry, but state ownership is 
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definitely present in many other sectors as well. This makes it especially 
appropriate to study the performance difference of SOEs and PCs in the 
Norwegian context, because we can expect to find a relatively large set of 
comparable companies that actually compete in the same market.  
To simply compare the performance of all SOEs and PCs in a population 
of firms is likely to lead to flawed conclusions since most PCs do not 
compete with any SOEs in their respective markets, and vice versa. To deal 
with this problem, we conduct analyses were we impose various selection 
criteria to increase the likelihood that firms with different types of ownership 
actually compete in the same market. To our knowledge, no previous study 
has analysed the performance differences of different owner types based on a 
data set covering basically the full population of firms in a country, and 
examined such differences while checking for the presence of competition 
between firms.      
We employ two alternative performance measures: return on assets 
(ROA) and cost share (Cost) measured in terms of operational costs as share 
of sales revenue. Using either measure our data indicate that the performance 
of SOEs is indeed inferior to that of PCs after controlling for the market 
structure. This finding is not sensitive to alternative selection criteria and is 
also highly robust when controlling for geographical and industrial 
characteristics that may serve as indicators for regional and industrial policy. 
Our study also shows that performance is positively related to the market 
share of companies as well as the market concentration. The latter is 
measured in terms of the Herfindahl index on NACE 5-digit level. Hence, 
we provide support for both the ownership identity and the market structure 
view on performance. We also test whether PC and SOEs react differently 
on a change in market concentration and market power. The results indicate 
that increased competition is less detrimental to SOE performance than to 
PC performance. Given the weaker overall performance of SOEs, this may 
seem surprising, but the results are in line with theoretical predictions based 
on principal agent models where competition serves as a disciplining device; 
the principal gains access to external information from competitors on how 
to run operations efficiently (see e.g. Nalebuff and Stiglitz [1983]).  
The paper is organized as follows: We discuss the theoretical relationship 
between ownership and market structure in section 2.  Section 3 describes 
the data set and discusses our choice of performance measures. In section 4 
we present and discuss our model and results while section 5 concludes.         
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2. Ownership and performance differences: Theory 
The vast majority of theoretical contributions to the study of performance 
and ownership identity explain the inferiority of SOEs based on incentive 
problems in the public sector. Even so, from the industrial economics 
literature we know that performance in terms of profits or, alternatively, 
returns on capital or rewards to shareholders, also is a function of the 
structure of the market. Stronger competition tends to drive down profits and 
the ability to reward the owners through dividends. Thus, an empirical 
analysis of the relationship between ownership identity and performance 
must take the existing market structures into consideration. Below, we first 
present a brief theoretical discussion of the links between ownership identity 
and performance primarily based on principal-agent theory. Then we 
introduce market structure as a disciplining force and discuss how this force 
may affect the performance of SOEs and private firms differently. Finally, 
we briefly discuss alternative motives for state ownership, and the 
consequence for the performance of SOEs. 
2.1. Ownership identity and performance incentives 
In the field of corporate governance, the relationship between ownership and 
performance is predominantly analyzed within the context of conflicting 
interests between owners and managers, and the “collective action” 
problems that arise when firm ownership is highly fragmented (Berle and 
Means [1932]; Baumol [1959]; Jensen and Meckling [1976]; Jensen [1986]; 
Rappaport [1986]). In addition to the composition and concentration of 
owners, the institutional identity of owners may play an equally important 
role with regard to performance (see for example Thomsen and Pedersen 
[2000]). In public economics, increasing attention is devoted to the factors 
that explain why performance may differ between SOEs and PCs (Stiglitz 
[1988]; Grout and Martin [2003]). Once again, the analysis is predominantly 
based on how different principal-agent configurations affect the incentives to 
perform.2 Stiglitz [1988] distinguishes between two categories of incentives 
in his discussion of the incentives ramifications of public ownership:  
 
Individual incentives: Whereas private owners are predominantly 
concerned about firm performance in terms of indicators such as return on 
their assets, equity, or investment, public owners often have alternative or 
multiple objectives. Even in the case where the only public objective is, say, 
return on assets, the ability of maximizing such returns is hampered due to 
incentive problems on the ownership side. Returns from a SOE are not 
passed on directly to the government representatives appointed to follow the 
company, but are channelled into a public budget that no specific individual 
can take advantage of as a principal. Hence, the incentives to closely 
scrutinize the actions and efforts of agents are vastly reduced in SOEs. 
Second, in most countries there are institutional rigidities that limit the 
ability of SOEs to correct for information asymmetries between principals 
and agents through incentive systems. For instance, the public sector is 
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locked into a pay structure that limits the ability to link management salaries, 
as well as workers’ wages, to performance (efficiency wages). Third, in most 
industrialized countries job security has traditionally been stronger in the 
public sectors than in the private sector. This may attract workers with a 
strong preference for job security. With a reduced probability of getting 
fired, workers may put less effort into their jobs and hence have less 
incentive to perform well.  
 
Organisational incentives: Markets – and especially the capital market –
constantly monitor PCs. If PCs employ their resources inefficiently, the 
market may respond by withdrawing capital from the company, taking over 
the company and re-allocate its resources (internally or externally), or 
ultimately shutting the company down. As outlined in Megginson and Netter 
[2001], SOEs have softer budgets and are not directly subject to the 
disciplining laws of the capital markets. The question of whether to shut 
down a SOE is not decided by the market, but by politicians.3 
2.2. Competition and the performance of PCs and SOEs 
According to Stiglitz [1988] competition also sorts under what is termed 
organisational incentives. From standard Cournot oligopoly theory we know 
that as the number of firms increases in a market, the monopoly rent is 
competed away. Thus, even though a state owned firm is less efficient, e.g. 
due to individual incentive problems, its performance in terms of profits may 
be larger than a privately owned firm since it confronts less fierce 
competition. If less efficient SOEs compete with PC in a given market, one 
would expect that the SOEs would suffer the most from more intense 
competition. However, there is an additional aspect of competition that tends 
to be ignored. If a firm confronts principal-agent problems of the kind 
mentioned above, the emergence of competing firms will enable the 
principal to make comparisons with other firms and thus reveal some of the 
hidden information held by managers or workers. In that way, competition 
works as a disciplining mechanism for the organisation. This mechanism is 
discussed in Nalebuff and Stiglitz [1983] and later analyzed more thoroughly 
in Bertoletti and Poletti [1997]. Also, Demski and Sappington [1984] and 
Vickers [1995] show that the possibility of relative performance evaluations 
in a market changes the principal agent problem drastically in favour of the 
principal.  
For simplicity, let us assume that privately owned firms are profit 
maximizing and that private principals have no problems with information 
asymmetries. In that case, privately owned firms will minimize costs 
regardless of the level of competition. Stronger competition will simply lead 
to reduced profits. Furthermore, let us accept, for the moment, that the 
incentive structure provides lower profits in the SOE. If the SOE operates in 
a market open for existence of other firms, stronger competition will on the 
one hand drive down profits, but will on the other hand contribute to more 
efficient production through the outlined information revelation mechanism. 
All other things equal, this means that stronger competition may be less 
detrimental to state owned firms than to privately owned firms. This 
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theoretical prediction is formally derived in Bertoletti and Poletti [1997], but 
they do not relate this problem directly to the question of ownership identity. 
Our empirical analysis of performance differences (see section IV) is 
specifically designed to take account of the interactions between ownership 
identity, market structure and performance. 
2.3. Alternative reasons for weaker performance under state ownership 
As mentioned above, there are several motives for state ownership that may 
directly affect performance. One of the most common examples relates to 
the supply of public goods where limited excludability contributes to lower 
profits. Another obvious example relates to the existence of natural 
monopolies where the government finds reason to produce the good itself at 
a socially optimal price level. In our empirical analysis we explicitly leave 
out public firms that are public goods providers and natural monopolies with 
regulated prices.  
In Norway, several SOEs are established in specific areas to maintain a 
desired population settlement pattern. If transportation costs are high, or the 
access to skilled workers is limited, regional policies may contribute to 
reduced performance. In this study, we employ a large set of regional 
dummies in order to take account of possible regional policy effects on 
performance. Security policy has repeatedly been put forward as a reason for 
running SOEs that provide goods and services that are regarded as crucial in 
times of conflict. This applies not only to providers of equipment to the 
armed forces, but also for infrastructure services and agricultural products.  
Finally, public control over natural resources is commonly seen as an 
argument for public ownership. For instance, the rent or profits related to 
extraction of natural resources such as oil are often high and it can be 
important for the government to keep as much of the rent on the hands of the 
state. Consequently, we exclude natural resource sectors with strong public 
control and supra-normal profits (i.e. the oil and natural gas sector and the 
electricity sector).  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data  
In this study, we use data from the Norwegian Register of Company 
Accounts (NRCA).4 According to current accounting laws in Norway, 
commercial companies that are joint-stock companies or that have more than 
4 employees or more than 5 million NOK in annual turnover, must hand in 
extensive information to the NRCA. Thus, in principle the NRCA database 
covers the full population of companies in Norway above a certain size. In 
1999, a total of 130,000 companies were included in the NRCA. As far as 
we know, no other empirical study of performance differences between 
SOEs and PCs has been based on data covering the full population of firms 
in a country. 
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The dataset contains information on a large number of company 
characteristics.5 An ownership variable identifies whether the majority 
owner of each firm is a private person, a public authority, another firm or a 
foreign owner.6 The municipal location of a firm is identified, providing us 
with information on geographical location along several dimensions. The 
NACE industry classification code is given on a 5-digit level. This allows us 
to study industrial activities on a highly disaggregated level and helps us to 
ensure that competition in the market is specified at the correct level. The 
remaining variables are accounting items.  
For several reasons, the full NRCA dataset must be reduced before 
conducting an econometric analysis. First, since we focus on the ultimate 
owner, we disregard companies that are organized as co-operative ventures 
or as groups, i.e. companies that have firms as their owners or that are a part 
of a holding company. Campbell et al. [1995] argue that many corporate 
parent companies systematically destroy value, which in turn will produce 
performance figures that are biased. Second, the banking and finance sectors 
report accounts in a way that is different from other sectors. These industries 
are usually omitted in studies that rely on accounting information for 
comparative purposes. Third, we further delimit our dataset by excluding 
natural resource extracting sectors and a wide selection of sectors where the 
presence of public sector regulations is strong. Health and social services 
provided through institutions is one example, theatrical services is another. 
In Appendix 2, we give an overview of the sectors that are included in the 
analysis of the year 1999 for the most restrictive models (see section IV). 
Finally, unexpected events in the operations of small firms usually have a 
higher impact on their performance than is the case for larger firms. Also, 
experience shows that reporting errors are much more common in firms with 
few employees. Consequently, we have set a lower size limit for the dataset 
at a minimum of 10 employees.  
3.2. The reliability of registered accounting values 
For accounting purposes, transactions are normally measured at their 
historical cost, the amount of cash or other resources exchanged for the 
assets or liabilities. Most accounting regimes, including the Norwegian, have 
chosen to ignore changes in values subsequent to acquisition. Thus, market 
value, exit value and repurchase value are seldom considered in financial 
reports. Historical costs have dominated accounting reports mainly because 
they are objective and verifiable. Compared to the alternatives, historical 
cost data are simple to obtain and easy to control. If inflation is moderate and 
the transactions are fairly recent, historical costs generally provide an 
objective proxy of the market value of the assets.  
Against this background, companies and their performance are valued 
through their accounting values. The differences between registered 
accounting value and the intrinsic/ market values of the firm, define in effect 
a tax shelter. This implies that the accounting value (“book-value”) of a 
company is often reported lower than the intrinsic value. In some cases the 
accounting value of a company will be set higher than the intrinsic value. 
Because accounts allow a degree of biased subjective judgment to influence 
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costs and revenues, it is possible to manipulate the bottom line. The motives 
can be to delay or soften a fall in profit, to maximize a crisis in order to 
create a larger room for improvement, or to create a favourable image of the 
company that persuades investors to provide financial support (Barney 
[1997]).7  
Several scholars have suggested that accounting based adjustments and 
procedures remove the true economic information from internal accounts 
and annual reports (Solomon [1970]; Fisher and McGowan [1983]). 
Unfortunately, the critics of estimated accounting adjustments do not suggest 
any superior alternatives. We acknowledge that accounting based measures 
do not represent a perfectly objective assessment of true economic 
performance. However, none of the options are based on pure and objective 
figures. Consequently, in this study we stick to accounting values because 
they are available for all Norwegian companies. The accounting principles 
regulated by law are maintained through a well-educated network of auditors 
and public institutions. The reliability of accounting values should therefore 
be sufficient for our purpose.  
3.3. The performance measures 
This study does not intend to analyze performance in terms of productivity 
(see Boardman and Vining [1989] for a study focusing on productivity). 
Such a study would require fixed price data on the firm level, which are not 
available in the present setting. The choice of a performance measure is a 
complex subject. Barney [1997] discusses several measures of performance 
that might be appropriate when conducting strategic analyses of a firm. One 
is survival. The simple argument is that if the firm survives, it generates 
normal economic value. This measure is not suitable for the present study 
because SOEs rarely are exposed to the sanctions of disciplining market 
forces, which in turn lead to exit. Other measures of performance include 
stakeholder approaches, which focus on several dimensions of the activities 
of the company. Such approaches are useful if the idea is to investigate the 
success of SOEs in reaching multiple goals, but unfortunately it is difficult to 
operationalise relevant performance measures in such contexts.  
Since this study is grounded on corporate governance and industrial 
economics perspectives, it is reasonable to employ a performance measure 
that reflects the benefits for owners in terms of an economic profitability 
measure of the company. Hence, we chose to study performance in terms of 
return on assets (ROA), calculated as the ratio of the operating profit to the 
total assets of the firm.8 By using ROA, we employ a performance measure 
that captures the performance differences between SOEs and PCs that will 
be affected both by managerial (operational and financial) slack and by 
market conditions.9 Selling and Stickney [1989] examine ROA and its 
components profit margin and asset turnover for 22 different sectors of 
commerce from 1977 to 1986. They note that an infinite number of 
combinations of turnover and profit margin could lead to the same level of 
ROA. For example, real estate and grocery stores both had a ROA of around 
6%, although their profit margins were 1.6% and 12.1% respectively. The 
explanation is simply that the grocery stores turn around their assets much 
faster than a real estate company. In fact, Selling and Stickney illustrate that 
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the profit margin is not sufficient as a cross-industry performance measure. 
Combined with asset turnover, the performance measure becomes more 
stable across industries. ROA is calculated as follows: 
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where t = time period, RaFP = Result after Financial Posts, FC = Financial 
Costs, and TA = Total Assets.10 Due to extraordinary situations or 
dispositions, some companies will have extremely high or low ROA. Below 
we set a standard for what is obviously not normal “interest” on commercial 
engagements. If ROA is higher than 100% it follows that the profit of the 
company is at least equal to all its assets. This means that the company has 
doubled the value of its (average) assets during the last year. Similarly, a 
ROA of less than –100% means that the company has lost all its assets, 
financed by both equity and debt, in the course of the preceding year. Thus, 
we only allow firms with ROA within this range. The distribution of ROA for 
the year 1999 is depicted in Figure 1. The distribution of ROA among the 
companies is following a distribution close to the normal distribution.11  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of ROA in 1999. 
 
 
In addition to ROA, we present estimates based on an alternative cost 
based performance measure. Since the goals and purposes of SOEs often are 
complex and multifaceted, one may argue that focusing exclusively on return 
on assets is too simplistic or even that the measure lacks clear relevance for 
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many such firms. Operational costs as share of sales value (Cost) is a 
measure that deals more directly with the running of operations, and is 
possibly more consistent with measures of cost minimization. Results based 
on this alternative measure are presented in Appendix 1.  
3.4. Explanatory variables 
The main explanatory variable in this study is ownership  identity. The 
variable is designed as a dummy variable taking the value of 0 if a company 
is an SOE and 1 if it is a PC. We use two alternative measures describing the 
market structure: The firm’s market share is a firm specific variable, while 
the Herfindahl concentration index is a market specific variable. We 
calculate market shares and Herfindahl indexes on a 5-digit NACE-code 
level. In 1999, the database comprised activities in 577 different 5-digit 
sectors. Hence, the basis for calculating market shares and competition is 
highly detailed. According to Davies and Geroski [1997], sector specific 
concentration measures like the Herfindahl index do not vary much over 
time, while firm specific measures like the market share display more 
variation across time. Furthermore, sector specific measures tend to correlate 
strongly with industry dummies. Consequently, we run regressions with the 
two measures separately in order to identify possible differences. 
Performance may correlate with size due to economies of scale . Thus, a size 
variable measured in terms of total sales revenue is included. New 
companies often have an “incubation period” where performance is low, 
because attention is given to getting the enterprise on its feet. We take into 
account the effect of age on performance by including the variable age. A 
small number of the companies in the population are listed on the Oslo stock 
exchange (public listing). It is likely that the value of assets in these 
companies lies closer to the market value. Thus, we expect ROA to be lower 
among publicly listed firms. We control for this by including a public listing 
dummy. The location of companies can be an important factor explaining 
performance (see section II). In Norway, location effects are mainly 
expected to have an urban/rural dimension (town), a capital/not capital 
dimension (Oslo), and a North-South dimension (Northern Norway). We 
consider all three dimensions separately, which also serve to cancel out some 
of the effects of political goals regarding, inter alia, settlement and regional 
policies.  
Different measures of performance vary systematically from industry to 
industry (see Venkatraman and Vasudevan [1986]). The nature and type of 
assets vary systematically by industries, and the valuation of these different 
assets will in turn affect various performance measures based on these 
assets. In addition, profit margins vary substantially between industries. 
Also, if SOEs predominantly exist in industries with strongly deviating 
performance patterns, this should be taken into account. In all our empirical 
models industry affiliation is controlled for at the NACE 2-digit level 
(containing approximately 50 sectors).  
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4. Empirical models and results 
Our objective is to map how ownership identity affects performance when 
we take into consideration the structures of the markets where firms operate. 
In this context, it is important to design a model that ensures that firms 
actually compete with each other. Our baseline econometric model takes the 
following form: 
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where i is an index over firms. N is the full set of firms, while Nh (h=1,2) is 
the subset of firms that corresponds to the sector selection criteria described 
below. l is an index over location specific properties and k=1,..K is an index 
over industries defined at the 2-digit NACE level. 
 In 1999, SOEs were present in 72 out of the 577 NACE 5-digit 
sectors. An analysis of how competition affects performance based on all 
sectors could thus be severely distorted since a majority of the sectors do not 
have any state owned activity. To deal with this problem, we estimate three 
versions of (2) based on alternative sector selection criteria: 
Selection criterion 1 (N1) is the most restrictive and requires that the 
number of SOEs or PCs in a sector must at least represent 10% of the firms. 
This criterion reduces the total number NACE 5-digit sectors over the period 
1990 to 1999 from 631 to 53, and reduces the number of observations from 
more than 70000 to about 2300. Table A3 in Appendix 2 gives an overview 
of which sectors we include under this criterion and the number of SOEs and 
PCs in each sector for the year 1999.  
Selection criterion 2 (N2) requires that a sector contains at least one SOE 
and two PCs. This criterion is considerably less restrictive as it allows 73 
sectors and more than 20000 observations to enter the model.  
Finally, we run regressions for the unrestricted sample  (N) in order to 
check whether the results based on the models with selection deviate 
substantially from the results derived in a model that represents all firms.  
Table 1 and 2 present summary statistics and cross-correlations for the 
unrestricted sample and the sample under selection criterion 1, respectively. 
A closer look at the cross-correlation tables reveals that there is no reason to 
expect large problems of multicollinearity. The only variables that correlate 
really highly are the two market structure variables market share and 
Herfindahl, but they never enter the same regression models.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Number of obs Mean   Std. Dev. Min Max
Full population
ROA 74583 15,30 14,61 -100,00 100,00
Market share 74583 0,07 0,17 0,00 1,00
Herfindahl 74583 0,12 0,20 0,00 1,00
Size 74583 29558,24 146122,00 -30,00 13200000,00
Age 74583 12,58 13,65 0,00 138,00
Cost share 74583 0,96 1,18 0,00 10,00
Restricted sample according to criteria 1:
ROA 2306 14,79 15,89 -71,17 98,18
Market share 2306 0,11 0,18 0,00 1,00
Herfindahl 2306 0,27 0,22 0,05 1,00
Size 2306 68235,87 461772,50 0,00 13200000,00
Age 2306 16,76 18,67 0,00 117,00
Cost share 2288 0,97 0,87 0,01 10,00
Table 2: Cross correlations
ROA Ownership Market share Herfindahl Size Age Public listing Town Oslo
Full population
ROA 1.000
Ownership 0.109 1.000
Market share 0.008 -0.012 1.000
Herfindahl -0.010 -0.018 0.767 1.000
Size -0.012 -0.075 0.224 0.142 1.000
Age -0.036 -0.046 0.119 0.102 0.106 1.000
Public listing 0.016 0.043 0.034 0.019 0.035 0.072 1.000
Town -0.027 0.019 0.185 0.143 0.299 0.100 0.042 1.000
Oslo 0.020 0.036 0.084 0.070 0.064 0.105 0.344 0.068 1.000
Northern Norway -0.027 -0.056 -0.046 -0.047 -0.020 -0.031 -0.136 -0.025 -0.146
Restricted sample according to criteria 1:
ROA 1.000
Ownership 0.252 1.000
Market share 0.001 -0.144 1.000
Herfindahl 0.036 -0.042 0.340 1.000
Size -0.041 -0.140 0.386 0.201 1.000
Age -0.061 -0.201 0.101 0.066 0.010 1.000
Public listing -0.032 -0.081 0.160 0.095 0.091 0.031 1.000
Town -0.024 0.097 0.176 0.116 0.073 0.194 0.106 1.000
Oslo 0.034 0.056 0.219 0.156 0.158 0.049 0.401 0.017 1.000
Northern Norway -0.051 -0.171 -0.071 -0.050 -0.029 0.038 -0.094 0.026 -0.158
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4.1. Results based on selection criterion 1 
The estimates based on regression models under selection criterion 1 are 
reported in Table 3 as models 1A to 1D. Model 1A and 1B report OLS 
regression estimates for ROA using market share and Herfindahl 
respectively.12 Since the OLS regressions report significant differences from 
one year to another (see the year dummies), we suspect that year specific 
coefficient estimates may vary significantly. In response to this, we estimate 
“average” models using the between estimator, which are reported in 1C and 
1D. All models include industry dummies. Under the strict selection 
criterion 1, estimates are based on 2306 observations over the ten-year 
period, out of which 650 are SOEs.  
In all four models, both the ownership identity and market structure 
variables are significant with expected signs. ROA in SOEs is approximately 
10 percentage points below the ROA in PCs. From the lower part of Table 1, 
we know that the average ROA amounts to approximately 15%, thus SOE 
ROA is only a third of the PC ROA. The proceeding discussion will show 
that this finding is highly robust to alternative model specifications. There is 
therefore reason to claim that ownership identity has a surprisingly strong 
effect on ROA, even when market structure factors and other relevant factors 
are controlled for.  
A larger market share contributes consistently to a higher ROA, implying 
that there is a positive effect on returns from a stronger monopoly rent. A 10 
percentage point increase in the market share lifts ROA by somewhere 
between 0.4 and 0.8 percentage points. Similarly, a 10-percentage point 
increase in the market concentration rate (i.e. independent of the firm’s 
market share) lifts ROA by almost 1 percentage point. This suggests that 
pricing power is stronger in more concentrated sectors, which contributes 
directly to an improved ROA. It is somewhat surprising that neither firm size 
nor firm age have significant impacts on ROA in the regressions using 
selection criterion 1, but in models 2 and 3 these variables become 
significant with expected signs. The dummy variable for public listing is also 
highly significant with an expected negative coefficient; publicly listed 
companies are compelled to report asset values closer to the market value. 
Finally, firms located in the capital region, have a higher ROA, while being 
located in Northern Norway contributes to lower ROA. 
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Table 3: Regression results: Models where SOEs and PCs compete
Selection criterion1:
Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D
OLS OLS BE BE
Ownership 9.21 *** 9.14 *** 10.46 *** 10.21 ***
(0.84) (0.83) (1.60) (1.58)
Market share 4.18 * 8.39 *
(2.25) (4.47)
Herfindahl 8.24 *** 10.72 ***
(2.37) (3.65)
Size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Public listing -6.36 ** -6.22 ** -7.22 * -6.65 *
(2.35) (2.21) (3.90) (3.83)
Town -0.70 -0.55 -0.36 -0.14
(0.72) (0.72) (1.24) (1.23)
Oslo 1.22 1.25 0.92 1.13
(1.24) (1.23) (1.65) (1.64)
Northern Norway -0.61 -0.63 0.29 0.19
(0.95) (0.96) (1.78) (1.78)
1990 2.22 2.05
(1.66) (1.66)
1991 4.68 *** 4.62 ***
(1.28) (1.27)
1992 7.28 *** 7.24 ***
(1.50) (1.49)
1993 6.86 *** 7.08 ***
(1.50) (1.50)
1994 4.26 ** 4.52 **
(1.63) (1.63)
1995 3.40 ** 3.51 **
(1.48) (1.48)
1996 1.99 1.91
(1.35) (1.34)
1997 0.65 0.96
(1.40) (1.41)
1998 0.12 0.46
(1.16) (1.17)
Constant 5.88 *** 3.86 ** 3.96 1.71
(1.19) (1.47) (7.06) (7.11)
Number of obs 2306 2306 2306 2306
Number of SOE obs 650 650 650 650
Number of firms 790 790
F( 17, 21425) 11.84 12.62 2.73 2.91
Prob > F 0 0 0 0
R-squared 0.119 0.1238 0.097 0.1
Adj R-squared 0.1039 0.1087
Root MSE 15.045 15.004
Huber White sandwich heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parenthesis
*** = 0.01 sign. level   ** = 0.05 sign. level    * = 0.1 sign. level
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4.2. Results based on selection criterion 2 
By relaxing the sector selection according to criterion 2, the empirical results 
(see Table 4) are altered only marginally. There are then more than 20000 
observations covering 5202 firms. The number of SOE observations is 
almost doubled compared to criterion 1. The ownership coefficients remain 
highly significant and stay in the range between 8 and 10. The market share 
coefficient has approximately the same size and significance level as those 
reported in Table 3, but the Herfindahl index is no longer significant. This 
may indicate that our selection criterion is too loosely defined, implying that 
models 1A – 1D are better suitable to analyse how market structures affect 
ROA. Although one should not put too much emphasis on the R2 measure, 
the fact that R2 is four times higher in the most restrictive model may also 
serve as an indicator of the most appropriate specification. 
 Size gains some explanatory power in models 2B and 2D, where the 
market size variable is left out, but the impact on ROA is negligible since the 
coefficients are close to zero. The variable age comes only out weakly 
significant when the model is estimated using the between estimator, which 
suggests that small variations in age do not have any major impact on ROA. 
The public listing and the Oslo variables are once again consistently 
significant with the expected signs, as is the Northern Norway dummy in 
models 2A and 2B. 
4.3. A comparison with results based on the full population of firms 
In Table 5, we report our findings based on all firms in our database as 
described in Section 3, i.e. regardless of whether SOEs and PCs are 
represented in the same sector or not. In fact, this unrestricted model 
provides the same predictions regarding the effect of ownership identity on 
ROA. From this, one may conclude that the inferior performance of SOEs is 
highly persistent and of a similar magnitude whether SOEs compete with 
PCs or not. In this way, our comparison with the unrestricted model gives 
additional support to the hypothesis that SOEs indeed struggle with 
performance problems that do not relate to the market structure per se. In 
other words, the comparison adds strength to the corporate governance 
perspective on the performance of SOEs.  
 The market share coefficients are once again significant, while the 
Herfindahl index either report insignificant or weakly significant with an 
unexpected sign. This finding strengthens once more the claim that models 
1A to 1D are the best specifications for modelling the effect of market 
structure on firms’ performance.  
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Table 4: Regression results: Models where SOEs and PCs compete
Selection criterion 2:
Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D
OLS OLS BE BE
Ownership 9.21 *** 8.93 *** 10.55 *** 10.09 ***
(0.55) (0.55) (1.34) (1.33)
Market share 8.40 *** 8.86 *
(2.27) (4.58)
Herfindahl -1.01 -1.97
(1.45) (2.59)
Size 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.03 * 0.04 *
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Public listing -7.65 *** -6.73 *** -12.31 *** -11.52 ***
(1.58) (1.52) (2.66) (2.64)
Town -0.25 -0.24 -0.18 -0.15
(0.22) (0.22) (0.46) (0.46)
Oslo 1.57 *** 1.64 *** 1.32 * 1.35 *
(0.44) (0.44) (0.70) (0.70)
Northern Norway -0.55 * -0.57 * -0.67 -0.69
(0.30) (0.30) (0.64) (0.64)
1990 0.58 0.69
(0.57) (0.57)
1991 2.02 *** 2.12 ***
(0.51) (0.51)
1992 2.83 *** 2.89 ***
(0.51) (0.51)
1993 2.42 *** 2.46 ***
(0.47) (0.47)
1994 3.59 *** 3.62 ***
(0.46) (0.46)
1995 -0.14 -0.13 ***
(0.45) (0.45)
1996 -0.08 -0.08
(0.44) (0.44)
1997 1.30 *** 1.31 ***
(0.44) (0.44)
1998 1.13 ** 1.12 **
(0.45) (0.45)
Constant 5.43 *** 5.79 *** 2.65 4.59
(0.65) (0.66) (5.57) (5.55)
Number of obs 21469 21469 21469 21469
Number of SOE obs 1139 1139 1139 1139
Number of firms 5202 5202
F( 17, 21425) 28.21 28.04 5.8 5.71
Prob > F 0 0 0 0
R-squared 0.0299 0.0293 0.0368 0.0362
Adj R-squared 0.0279 0.0274
Root MSE 15.321 15.326
Huber White sandwich heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parenthesis
*** = 0.01 sign. level   ** = 0.05 sign. level    * = 0.1 sign. level
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Table 5: Regression results: Full population models
Model 3A Model 3B Model 3C Model 3D
OLS OLS BE BE
Ownership 8.46 *** 8.57 *** 8.34 *** 8.45 ***
(0.43) (0.43) (0.86) (0.86)
Market share 2.04 *** 1.63 **
(0.36) (0.83)
Herfindahl -0.33 -1.30 *
(0.35) (0.73)
Size 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age -0.03 *** -0.03 *** 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Public listing -5.01 *** -4.68 ** -8.12 *** -7.73 ***
(0.75) (0.74) (1.33) (1.33)
Town 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.11) (0.11) (0.25) (0.25)
Oslo 0.43 ** 0.49 ** 0.39 0.47
(0.20) (0.20) (0.37) (0.37)
Northern Norway -0.68 *** -0.69 *** -0.70 ** -0.72 **
(0.16) (0.16) (0.36) (0.36)
1990 -1.76 *** -1.67 ***
(0.26) (0.26)
1991 0.30 0.36
(0.24) (0.24)
1992 1.58 *** 1.63 ***
(0.24) (0.24)
1993 1.54 *** 1.59 ***
(0.23) (0.23)
1994 1.80 *** 1.84 ***
(0.22) (0.23)
1995 -0.51 ** -0.48 **
(0.22) (0.22)
1996 -0.14 -0.11
(0.22) (0.22)
1997 0.75 *** 0.78 **
(0.22) (0.22)
1998 0.57 ** 0.59 ***
(0.23) (0.23)
Constant 7.06 *** 7.06 *** 7.32 *** 7.49 ***
(0.45) (0.45) (1.55) (1.55)
Number of obs 74583 74595 74583 74595
Number of SOE obs 2849 2849 2849 2849
Number of firms 15167 15170
F( 17, 21425) 55.73 54.96 8.21 8.16
Prob > F 0 0 0 0
R-squared 0.0281 0.0277 0.0316 0.0314
Adj R-squared 0.0272 0.0268
Root MSE 14.408 14.412
Huber White sandwich heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parenthesis
*** = 0.01 sign. level   ** = 0.05 sign. level    * = 0.1 sign. level
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4.4. The interaction between ownership identity and market structure 
As outlined in Section 2.2, one may argue that changes in competition 
affects SOEs and PCs differently, given that SOEs struggle with larger 
principal-agent problems than PCs. Based on traditional IO theory with 
heterogeneous firms, stronger competition will have a relatively stronger 
negative impact on profits and thus ROA for the weaker performers. 
However, if weak performance is due to principal-agent problems, the 
demonstration effect from new competitors may improve efficiency and 
contribute to improve ROA. In order to examine how changes in competition 
and market shares affect the performance of different owners, we estimate 
owner-specific firm fixed effects models based on the most restrictive sector 
selection criterion. In a firm fixed effects model, both the public listing 
variable and the location variables drop out since they display no variation 
over time and the information in the age variable is uninterpretable.13 We are 
consequently left with a model where ROA is regressed on the market 
structure variables and size, only. It turns out that for PCs a drop in the 
market concentration index contributes to a significant reduction in ROA. 
Likewise, a fall in the market share also cuts ROA. However, this is not the 
case for SOEs. Firm specific variations in market shares have no significant 
impact on ROA, and more fierce competition is actually gainful for SOEs. 
Notice however that models 5A and 5B fail the F-test for the overall 
specification, which gives reason to question the validity of our results. 
Thus, we interpret these findings as weak evidence supporting the learning 
effect through stronger competition, which relates directly to the problems of 
corporate governance.  
 
Table 6: Fixed effect estimates for ROA: Selection criteria 1
Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B
PC PC SOE SOE
Market share 28,78 *** 7,40
(7,91) (8,29)
Herfindahl 12,30 ** -1,57 **
(4,79) (5,35)
Size 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00)
Constant 14,57 *** 13,75 *** 7,17 *** 8,72 ***
(1,09) (1,61) (1,32) (1,61)
sigma_u 16,20 16,22 12,81 12,62
sigma_e 11,91 11,95 10,91 10,92
rho 0,65 0,65 0,58 0,57
Number of obs 1656 1656 650 650
Number of firms 604 604 186 186
F(2,15353) 6,62 3,31 0,67 0,32
Prob>F 0,0014 0,037 0,5121 0,7294
R-sq within 0,01 0,006 0,003 0,001
F test all u_i=0 0 0 0 0
Huber White sandwich heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parenthesis
*** = 0.01 sign. level   ** = 0.05 sign. level    * = 0.1 sign. level
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4.5. An alternative performance measure 
The empirical results based on our alternative performance measure (cost) 
are presented in Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix 1. Here we only report 
results based on the between estimator, since the OLS results provide similar 
estimates.14 The ownership coefficients are highly significant in all model 
specification and vary between –0.04 and –0.06. Since the population mean 
cost share is registered around 0.96, ownership identity (SOE or PC) will in 
many cases determine whether a firm runs with an operational surplus or 
deficit. The Herfindahl index (see Table A1) is significant and negative in 
the restricted models, indicating that market concentration affects our 
alternative performance measure in the same way as it affects ROA. 
Similarly, a higher market share contributes to reduce costs relative to sales 
revenue (see Table A2), while size and age have negligible effects on our 
cost performance measure in all models. We thus conclude that ownership 
identity affects the alternative performance measure in the same way as it 
affects ROA.     
5.  Conclusions 
Performance must be regarded as a critical issue in any discussion of the 
pros and cons of privatization. If companies owned and operated by the state 
systematically generate weaker economic results than privately owned firms, 
the advocates of privatization seemingly get a strong card in their hands. As 
it is, most theoretical contributions to the study of performance and 
ownership identity maintain the inferiority of state enterprises based on 
incentive problems in the public sector. However, given the various non-
economic goals that underlie the very existence of many state owned 
enterprises, the inferior economic performance of SOEs in general should 
not be surprising (Grout and Martin [2003]). A more relevant question 
relates to whether SOEs perform worse or better than comparable PCs.  
There are two different views on this issue. The corporate governance 
literature focuses on ownership identity and suggests that SOEs have weaker 
incentives to perform since they are less exposed to the disciplining forces of 
markets. The industrial economics literature maintains that economic 
performance is a direct function of the market structure. Competition will 
drive down profits and the ability to reward the owners through dividends. If 
state owned enterprises and privately owned companies operate under 
market structures that are systematically different from each other, 
performance differences could well be attributable to such differences rather 
than some ownership identity effect. Thus, an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between ownership identity and performance must take the 
existing market structure into consideration.  
In this paper, we have employed a comprehensive data set containing 
annual accounts information of Norwegian companies. Using return on 
assets as the measure of performance and carefully controlling for market 
structure and a range of factors that may have an impact on company 
performance, we find that the performance of SOEs is indeed inferior to that 
of PCs. However, the results also show that performance is consistently 
positively related to the market share of companies as well as the market 
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concentration. Hence, our findings provide support for both the ownership 
identity and the market structure explanations for performance differences. 
In addition, we explore the possible link between market structure and 
ownership identity, and our results provide some support to the idea that a 
weaker market power (measured in terms of the firm’s market share) is less 
detrimental to SOE performance than to PC performance.  
While we believe that this analysis represents an improvement over 
previous empirical studies, we acknowledge that further work should be 
done on the performance ramifications of public versus private enterprise.  
First, the Norwegian setting of the study is a mixed blessing from a 
research perspective. On the one hand, it represents a particularly well-suited 
empirical context due to the relatively abundant co-existence of SOEs and 
PCs in many industries as well as to the high quality and comprehensiveness 
of available data. On the other hand, Norway is a small, peripheral, and rich 
country with deep-rooted social democratic norms and values of 
egalitarianism and a history of active welfare policies and state intervention 
in the business sector. Even though we think that our findings depict 
economic mechanisms of a rather general nature, similar studies in other 
settings are obviously needed to establish the generalisability of the findings. 
Second, in this study we focus on two performance measures; ROA and 
costs. Both are highly appropriate in assessing the economic performance of 
companies, but inevitably they provide only a partial view. Describing a 
more complete picture of companies’ performance would necessitate a richer 
set of measures, especially to take proper account of the non-economic goals 
of business enterprise. That, however, must be left to future research. 
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Notes 
1. One important exception is Boardman and Vining [1989] who 
investigated both ownership identity and competition factors. 
2. The identity of owners is important because different types of owners 
are likely to have different preferences with regard to issues like risk and 
time horizon and because they have different abilities and opportunities in 
using various mechanisms of governance such as monitoring and decision-
making. The relative benefits and costs of ownership are therefore likely to 
vary depending on the type of owner.   
3. On the other hand, and for other reasons, political authorities may also 
decide to shut down state owned firms that would have survived if they had 
been organised as privately owned firms.  
4. The data have been registered by Dun & Bradstreet Norway. 
5. Our data set contains the following variables over the period 1990-
1999: Company identity number, name of the company, municipal location, 
year of establishment, NACE-code, number of employees, owner identity, 
turnover, cost of employees, operational profit/loss, financial costs, results 
after financial posts, total assets, equity value.  
6. The NRCA data do not reveal whether the foreign owned and 
stock exchange listed companies are governed by persons, public 
authorities or firms. We therefore chose to exclude foreign owned 
companies in the empirical analysis. 
7. In addition, the activation of goodwill in the accounts may increase the 
book value, resulting in a higher book value than intrinsic value. Depending 
on the nature of the activated goodwill, some can be marketed and thus be 
regarded in the intrinsic value (e.g. a brand), and some cannot (e.g. the 
culture of a firm). Goodwill, which has many components, is often activated 
in the context of a take-over price of businesses. Generally, a more dynamic 
market for businesses will tend to depolarise the book and intrinsic value. 
8. Subsidies and other kinds of government financial support may distort 
the picture of ROA differences between SOEs and PCs. The effect of some 
of these schemes is captured in estimates of so-called Effective Rates of 
Assistance (ERA). A recent study by the Central Bureau of Statistics in 
Norway (Fæhn et al. [2001]) looked at a systematic sample of assistance 
arrangements. The study shows that some industries are more favoured than 
others. Our performance measure considers the profit margin before 
extraordinary accounting items, and most of the direct subsidies are included 
as extraordinary earnings in the accounts. Consequently, our performance 
measure will not be affected, in any significant way, by most subsidy 
schemes. Subsidies through the payroll tax do affect the profit margin 
directly, but such schemes are primarily related to geographical location, 
which we control for.  
9. Return on equity (ROE) is an alternative a measure of performance and 
was used in the study of Thomsen and Pedersen [2000]. However, ROE is 
associated with some troublesome characteristics. First, it is a measure of 
profitability that is highly influenced by the debt/equity ratio. This 
introduces a gearing effect to ROE that can lead to an excessively large 
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variance, and thus display company performance differentials that are 
incorrect. In addition, ROE cannot be calculated for companies with negative 
equity, a problem that we face in approximately 20% of Norwegian 
companies. 
10. This formula calculates ROA before taxes. For some companies we 
have no accounting information for t-1, and for those companies we use only 
total assets from period t in the denominator. 
11. The deviant peak is due to a number of companies that have ROA 
equal to 0. A closer inspection of such companies reveals that only one of 
the 313 companies with 0 in ROA had no turnover; that particular company 
was in a sense a “sleeping” company. However, for the other 312 companies, 
it seems relevant to keep them in the sample, even though they are imposing 
a deviation from the normal distribution. 
12. Notice that we cannot estimate fixed effects since the ownership 
variable hardly varies over time.  
13. There is some variation in location specific variables as well as 
ownership identity over time, but this relates to extremely few cases. 
14. Results based on OLS are available from the authors upon request. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Table A1: Regressions with cost share as dependent variable
Herfindahl index as the market structure indicator
Restr. criteria 1 Restr. criteria 2 Unrestricted
BE BE BE
Ownership -0.06 * -0.04 * -0.05 ***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Herfindahl -0.14 * -0.09 ** 0.02 *
(0.07) (0.04) (0.01)
Size 0.00 ** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Public listing 0.41 *** 0.31 *** 0.23 ***
(0.08) (0.04) (0.02)
Town -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
Oslo 0.04 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00)
Northern Norway -0.03 0.00 0.01
(0.04) (0.01) (0.00)
Constant 1.07 *** 1.77 *** 0.99 ***
(0.13) (0.08) (0.02)
Number of obs 2285 21372 74297
Number of firms 781 5184 15115
F( 17, 21425) 3.91 7.55 8.74
Prob > F 0 0 0
R-squared 0.135 0.0475 0.0337
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Table A2: Regressions with cost share as dependent variable
Market share as the market structure indicator
Restr. criteria 1 Restr. criteria 2 Unrestricted
BE BE BE
Ownership -0.06 * -0.04 * -0.04 ***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Market share -0.12 -0.20 ** -0.01 *
(0.09) (0.07) (0.01)
Size 0.00 * 0.00 * 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Public listing 0.43 *** 0.32 *** 0.23 ***
(0.08) (0.04) (0.02)
Town -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
Oslo 0.04 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00)
Northern Norway -0.03 0.00 0.01
(0.04) (0.01) (0.00)
Constant 1.04 *** 1.73 *** 0.99 ***
(0.13) (0.08) (0.02)
Number of obs 2285 21372 74279
Number of firms 781 5184 15115
F( 17, 21425) 3.84 7.62 8.69
Prob > F 0 0 0
R-squared 0.134 0.048 0.0335
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Appendix 2 
 
Table A3: Sectors represented in Models 1A -1D (Year = 1999)
    
Activity NACE-5 sector # SOE # PC
    
Wooden and fibre boards 20200 2 12
Wooden containers 20400 2 2
Other wooden products 20510 1 2
Metal wires 28730 1 2
Medical and surgical equipment  33100 1 6
Sports goods 36400 1 3
Electricity distribution 40102 8 2
Tram transport 60210 3 10
Buss transport 60211 8 7
Domestic coastal sea transport 61104 3 1
Transport hubs 63211 1 8
Parking lots and houses 63212 1 4
Tourist information services 63302 2 2
Telecommunication 64200 1 5
Real estate services 70100 9 78
Real estate development 70110 2 14
Real estate rental 70200 2 19
Database maintenance  72400 2 11
Architect services 74200 1 5
Consulting: product development 74405 1 9
Engineering education 80220 1 5
Rehabilitation 85114 1 9
Medical labs 85148 2 5
Veterinary services 85200 1 3
Social services, not institutions 85320 2 2
Sewage and sanitary services 90000 6 25
Cinema theatres 92130 1 2
Cultural activities, not theatre 92320 12 5
Other museums 92520 2 1
Natural reserves, recreational areas 92530 1 1
Sports arenas 92610 4 21
Cleaning services 93010 5 33
    
 
 
 
